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Abstract 
 The fight against terrorism has long relied on military intervention 
and hard power strategy to curb terror threats. Current reality and the spade 
at which youths who are radicalized under the banner of religion to carry out 
terrorist activities has called for more attention paid on alternative 
counterterrorism (CT) measures and policies. CT initiatives should be 
broadened to accommodate soft power approach that interrupts the 
radicalization and recruitment of civilians into violent extremism and 
terrorism. It is revealed that more terrorist actions and violent extremism had 
been undertaking by youths that professed the Islamic faith more than any in 
the 21st century. The worrisome trend has called the development of 
UMMAH as a CT strategy to understand the narratives and messaging 
exploited by recruiters and facilitators of violent extremism as a religious 
obligation. The strategy demands a counter narrative and messages that 
would replace the message of hate, violence and bigotry, with love, peace, 
tolerance and coexistence. 
 
Keywords: Islam, Counterterrorism, Narratives and Messages, 
Radicalization, Boko Haram 
 
Introduction 
 The horrific threat of terrorism from Non-State Actors (NSAs) is on 
the rise in both sophistications and magnitude. Unfortunately, the security 
challenges created by the NSAs have overwhelmed conventional system of 
warfare which relied on hard power or other traditional security approach to 
overcome the threats. Over the years, observable and concrete evidence has 
shown that relying on hard power strategy alone cannot be adequate or 
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effective in curbing violent extremism (CVE). This created the need for 
alternative counterterrorism (CT) policies and strategies.18Several 
governments are in different stages of articulating various initiatives in their 
respective bid to CT. One common characteristics of the emerging CT 
initiatives is the attention towards interruption of radicalization and 
recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism.19 It is this initiative that is 
now called Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) or Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE).  
 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) refers to preventive strategies 
for CT, i.e. identifying the push/pull factors that lead to radicalization and 
recruitment, and also designing measures to counter these factors. Recent 
discussion on CVE has incorporated PVE, to include other applicable 
measures which are long-term strategy that accommodates multidimensional 
issues such as employment and education.20 Incidentally, both CVE and or 
PVE are preventive strategies. They are both intervention strategy in 
arresting a violent attack from occurring or before an individual actively 
support terrorism. The strategy for CT is mainly non-coercive which usually 
begins with understanding the background particularly the narratives or 
messages of the terrorists while developing a counter-narrative and -
messages of the terrorist group. The strategy extends to educating the people, 
broad-based community engagement, de-radicalization, disengagement and 
rehabilitation programs, communities resilience programs among others. The 
assumption is that a well-articulated PVE or CVE program will curb and 
eventually put an end to violent extremism and by extension terrorism.  
 However, PVE or CVE programs are frameworks that cannot be 
obtained from speculations and conjectures. They are supposed to be derived 
by evidence-based research. For instance, a good understanding of the 
mannerism, attitude and habits among others, of Islamic teachings on peace 
and coexistence could be used againstBoko Haram narrative and messages to 
formulate the counter-narrative and -messaging against the incentive that 
sustains radicalization and other nefarious actions.  Knowledge about 
extremist groups and insurgents that takes up religion as a weapon of 
influence in building their narratives/messages, as much as developing the 
counter-narrative is research prone. It is this level of research that prompted 
                                                          
18Crelinsten R “Counterterrorism as Global Governance: A Research Inventory”, in M 
Ranstorp (ed), Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction, 
(Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2007), p.210.  
19 Sara Zeiger and Anne Aly, “Introduction: The Need for Research in Countering Violent 
Extremism Policy and Practice”, in Sara Zeiger& Anne Aly (eds), Countering Violent 
Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practices, (Hedayah and Curtin 
University), 2015, p.1 
20Ibid. 
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the articulation of “UMMAH” for CVE in Nigeria and the Sahel region. 
UMMAH is an acronym for “Using Muslims Mannerism and Habits” in 
order to engage, prevent and de-escalate violent extremism. It is a framework 
designed to create counter-narrative and messaging for violent extremism in 
Nigeria and the Sahel region. It is expected that the UMMAH for CVE 
framework will reduce the incentive and cut-off recruitment chain of 
extremist groups like Boko Haram. This is drawn on the assumption that 
terrorism in the 21st century and the narrative which sustains it, could be 
eradicated or brought into effective control, where the factors that nourishes 
violent extremism is understood and addressed. 
 In the conceptual development of UMMAH for CVE framework, 
cognizance was given to how groups use socio-religious rhetoric to entice 
young people in developing interest in their terrorist activities. This may 
cover among other factors, how they are radicalized and eventually recruited 
before being commissioned to embark on a hit. Therefore, the motivation 
and resource for this framework was obtained through face-too-face 
interview with Boko Haram inmates in some detention facilities in Abuja, 
and interview with some victims in Internally Displaced People’s (IDPs) 
Camps in Abuja and Maiduguri.21 The observations and comments of some 
military officers of the Nigerian Army (NA) who have served in the theatre 
of operation in Maiduguri were also considered in the formulation of the 
framework on UMMAH for CVE. All the foregoing is aimed at addressing 
extremist groups based on their motivation, especially where the motivations 
seem to come from religion influenced narrative and messages. 
 The authors acknowledged that the sample population of 5 inmates 
was used for this study. This is not enough to draw a holistic conclusion that 
will result in UMMAH for CVE. However, the research should be seen as a 
feasibility study and as such a preliminary for a more elaborate study. 
Further research into developing the paper has to augment with resources 
from other available sample population because of the high level restrictions 
in having access to target groups like Boko Haram inmates and more 
importantly, most of the military officers would only want to comment under 
anonymous conditions. For a proper understanding of this paper, the 
introduction is followed by a background that highlights the main issues 
relating to terrorism, radicalization, narratives, messages and the need for 
UMMAH as a strategy for CVE programs. This is followed by a brief 
definition of the terms; for instance, the narrative and overview of target 
                                                          
21Interview of some victims of Boko Haram at the IDPs from Mafa along Dikwa/Ngala 
Road, Maiduguri, 6 December 2015. 
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groups like Boko Haram violence and messages. The forth segment dwelled 
on the UMMAH strategy, implementation framework and the conclusion 
 
Background 
 Over the past decade, terrorist activities has been unfolding in many 
parts of the world like Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, 
France, to mention a few. The terrorist acts and the narrative that influence 
such actions have made perception about Islam to occupy an interest in 
global discourse. The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) continues to 
claim responsibility for most of the attacks around the world, using religious 
narratives as justification. Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) claims responsibility for terror attacks in Nigeria 
and Mali respectively. Boko Haram and AQIM have terrorized local 
communities, destroyed lives, properties and continually spread fearin areas 
they thrived, and which has continued to raise crucial concerns over their 
rising appeal. To look into motivation for such appeal based on increasing 
number of adherent who buy into their narratives and messages that 
culminate in violent extremism and threatens domestic and international 
security is vital. It has made the issue of CVE being propagated by several 
experts like Schmid22, Aly and Lucas23 among others to be in the centre stage 
of global agenda on CT. Some more optimists24 are even advocating for PVE 
instead of CVE. Whatever nomenclature that is put forward or adopted, the 
ultimate objective is to ensure that the world is able to overcome the threats 
of violent extremism by putting measures that could reduce or stop the 
abilityof the target group’s narrative and messages from appealing to hitherto 
normal people from being radicalized or to carry out terrorist acts of 
disturbing proportion. 
 The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) just like any other 
responsible government across the globe25 is also part of the global efforts to 
CT. Specifically; Nigeria is seeking solutions to overcome the threats of 
                                                          
22 Alex P Schmid, “Challenging the narrative of the Islamic State”, in Sara Zeiger& Anne 
Aly (eds), Ibid, p.67.  
23 Anne Aly and Kosta Lucas Countering Online Violent Extremism in Australia: Research 
and Preliminary Finding”, Sara Zeiger& Anne Aly (eds), Ibid, p.81. 
24 From 9-11 December 2014, Hedayah and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum held the 
Global CVE Communication EXPO 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates where it was 
emphasized that preventing violent extremism which seem proactive would be more 
effective than countering violent extremism which seem reactive. The event was attended by 
representatives of governments, industry partners, technology specialists, academic experts 
and civil society actors.   
25 Rachel Briggs and SebastienFeve, “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent 
Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government”? Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, 2013, accessed from the internet,  
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Jama’atuAhlisSunnaLidda’awatiwal-jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram. 
It is a notorious terrorist group flying the narrative of establishing an Islamic 
Caliphate.26 Since the start of the fight against Boko Haram in early 2000, 
the FGN has always relied on military action for CT. Analysis of the FGN 
military action so far, shows that the FGN has adopted the strategy of 
resisting through military actions and containment of Boko Haram to a 
certain extent. The reactivated Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
comprising military units from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin 
with headquarters in Bega, Borno State Nigeria, was the approach the 
government of Nigeria adopted to resist, curtail and eventually defeat Boko 
Haram. Defeating the terrorist group formed part of the campaign promises 
of President MuhammaduBuhari27 during his elections in early 2015. The 
military resistance produced some commendable results being seen as 
winning the war but not necessarily the battle against Boko Haram. The 
question to ask is whether the military campaign on Boko Haram alone can 
stop tendency of insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria?    
 The Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) which comprise of the Nigerian 
Army (NA), Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) on their 
part believe that they have done what is expected of them having destabilized 
the group and recaptured all the territories that were under Boko Haram 
control.28 In celebrating the successes from military action by the AFN, the 
Air Officer Commanding the Tactical Air Command Makurdi, 
AdeniyiOjuawo noted:  
All the terrorists could do at the moment was 
suicide bombing, we have degraded them to a 
level that for the past three weeks, we have not 
heard anything like suicide bombing.29 
 Indeed, the AFN alongside other security agencies in Nigeria could 
be adjudged to have successfully brought down the main structures of the 
terrorist acts in northeast Nigeria when compared with the sporadic 
firepower of Boko Haram some years back. Precisely in June 2014, Boko 
Haram attacked and captured Nigeria Police Mobile Training Camp in 
Gwoza, Maiduguri and hoisted its flag.30 The flag hoisting was a powerful 
message and a symbol of ‘heroism’-a trait that is very appealing to 
contemporary youths. It was found that every four days interval, between 
                                                          
26Muhammed Isa Kabir, xxxxxxx 
27 President MuhammaduBuhari, is the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He 
worn the March 2015 Presidential Polls and was sworn in on 29 May 2015. 
28 Ibid 
29 AVM AdeniyiOjuawo, speech made during the Base Socio-cultural Activity (BASA) 
Week, in Daily Trust Newspaper, Tuesday, January 12 2016, p.8. 
30 Channels Television News Track, 24 January 2015 
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June and November 2015, Boko Haram detonated bombs in different 
locations in the northeast.31 This was quite frightening and a very instructive 
message challenging the legitimacy of the Nigerian government. The 
frequency of bomb blasts may have reduced marginally. Even at that, we are 
still experiencing patches of successful cases of bomb blasts and attacks in 
different location in the northeast. In fact, in January 2016, Boko Haram was 
able to launch attacks on five villages simultaneously even though they were 
repelled by a resolute AFN which was not the case in the past.32 Therefore 
the argument over being able to meet a certain deadline by the Nigerian 
government to curb terrorism is not the crux of this paper. It is the ability to 
initiate a holistic component of resistance; resilience and diminishing 
influence terrorist groups have on a giving population and environment and 
develop counter-messages that matter to this research. 
 This does not imply that the paper had not recognized the success so 
far recorded by the AFN. Part of the current success achieved is that 
personnel of the AFN are more determined to engage the Boko Haram with a 
new type of incentive and support by both the government and the local 
communities. The local vigilantes and citizens now cooperate than 
previously with the AFN to identify members of terrorist group in their 
domain, and this has provided positive outcome. It is instructive therefore, to 
expand the civilian component for CVE. The AFN have captured all the 
territories previously occupied by Boko Haram. While Nigerians are grateful 
to the AFN, the Nigerian people (citizens) should be equipped with 
understanding of factors that promotes tolerance, coexistence and 
particularly rejecting narratives and messages that could disturb individual 
and collective peace. The increased collaboration between the military and 
civilians to CT in the North-east region of Nigeria indicates that people still 
yearn for the usual peaceful era where they go about improving their 
livelihood without fear of being stalked or being raided in their farmland. 
The collaboration shows that the people want a total end to Boko Haram in 
their socio-cultural and economic life.33 
 It is however surprising that even the massive presence of the 
Nigerian soldiers including the civilian vigilantes in most communities of the 
                                                          
31 Nigerian Newspaper compilation from June 2015 to December 2015, 
Thenewsnigeria.com, premiumtimesng.com, saharareporters.com  
32Channels Television, News Track, 24 January 2016 
33 Random sampling of opinion of 50 persons from Borno, Yobe, Kano, Bauchi and 
Nasarawa, The selected states are the states that have experienced different magnitude of 
Boko Haram attacks. Attacks include bomb blast, firearm assault, occupation or any other 
terrorist activity that would bring fear and uneasiness to the local communities. The opinion 
poll dwelled on what they think about Boko Haram. Over 96 per cent of them wished the 
FGN could totally overrun the group so that they can go back to their normal life. The 
remaining 4 percent declined commenting on the issue.   
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northeast, have not deterred violent attacks from Boko Haram. Instead, Boko 
Haram have become more elusive, sneaking through rugged and difficult 
terrains within the village routes, traversing stony paths and shrubs to attack 
innocent villagers, abduct women and children and sack traditional 
authorities. Some of the victims in these communities who escaped into IDPs 
Camps narrated the pathetic ordeal they had to go through in the hands of 
these terrorists. The severity of the situation could be better appreciated with 
the over 2.3 million peoples34 scattered in different IDPs Camps in different 
parts of the country including the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. The 
immediate concern of the FGN at this critical stage is therefore the way 
forward. One of the ways forward will depend on our understanding of the 
narrative and messages of Boko Haram and being able to develop counter-
narrative and messages to defeat such trend.  The subsequent paragraphs will 
define the terms narrative and messages in order to enhance the 
understanding of this paper.  
 
The Meaning of Narrative and Message  
 The words narratives and messages have been used in different 
studies as the same. Available literature specifically the works of Jacobson35, 
Briggs and Feve36, Chowdhury Fink and Jack Barclay37 are not definite on 
what the narrative of a terrorist organization is all about. As a result, it has 
been difficult to differentiate between narrative and messaging. However, it 
is established that every terrorist organization flaunts around with brand of 
narrative(s) and message(s) fed into the public psyche. Corman defines 
narrative as “a system of stories that share themes, forms and archetypes.38 
Similarly, Dimitriu notes that narratives are a resource for political actors to 
construct a shared meaning to shape perceptions, beliefs and behavior of the 
public”, they offer a structure through which a shared sense is achieved, 
                                                          
34 UNHCR-Nigeria Situation Report, High-Level Side Event on the Lake Chasd Basin, 70th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Headquarters, New York, 25 
September 2015.  
35 Michael Jacobson, Countering Violent Extremism Narratives”, National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (NCTb) 
January 2010, accessed from the internet, 13 January 2016, 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf 
36 Rachel Briggs SebastienFeve, “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent 
Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications? Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
accessed from the internet, 10 January 2016, 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf  
37Ibid. 
38 Steven R Corman, “Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic 
Communication”, in Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal (eds), Countering Violent 
Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies, (Washington DC: NSI Inc, September 2011), 
p.36. 
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representing a past, present and future, an obstacle and a desired end 
point.39Corman and Dimitriu’s definitions represented the kind of knowledge 
that this paper expects from having a composite understanding of narrative. 
However, it is loosely defined with no particular focus to the subject under 
discourse. Even the workshop of Experts on narratives and counter-
narratives, hosted by Hedayah in November 2014 failed to provide an 
agreeable definition of the term. The experts (Hedayah in November 2014) 
focused on the narrative of victims of terrorism which again does not 
explicitly explain what narrative is about.40 
 However, it must be clear from the foregoing that every terrorist 
organization has a narrative that it flaunts to the public. Fink and Barclay 
posited that the long-term survival and success of terrorist organizations 
depend on their ability to project a legitimizing narrative.41 This again speaks 
volume of the critical nature of a narrative to a terrorist organization. This is 
why a clear understanding of the narratives of terrorist groups can help to 
develop the requisite counter narratives. It is the narrative that terrorists use 
to continuously maintain, justify and sustain their terrorist actions. The 
narrative in this paper therefore is the baseline story of a shared belief and 
destiny to establish legitimacy and authority among those they wish to 
radicalize and eventual recruit to commit hits. It is usually a long term story 
with powerful content to achieve a certain objective. Fink and Barclay aptly 
highlighted the power of narrative and the need for counter narrative when 
they said:  
A growing consensus emerged among 
practitioners and policymakers that the 
ideologies, support structures, conditions, and 
legitimizing narratives of groups such as al-
Qaida needed to be effectively challenged in 
order for their recruiting and operating 
capacities to be diminished. Recognizing that 
terrorist groups can leverage grievances related 
to social and economic issues, governments 
have made efforts to work more closely with 
                                                          
39 George Dimitriu, Strategic Narratives, Counternarratives and Public Support for War: The 
Dutch Government’s Expalnation of the Uruzgan Mission and Influence on the Dutch Public 
(Leiden Unversity: Master Thesais, Campus The Hague, 2 February 2013), p.13. 
40 Sara Zaiger, “Narrative and Counter-Narratives”, CVE Research Brief, December 2014, 
Hedayah, Abu Dhabi  
41NaureenChowdhury Fink and Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism 
Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Centre for Global Counterterrorism 
Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 2013, accessed from the internet, 10 
January 2016, http://globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf.  
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local partners and communities to address 
ongoing issues of concern and preempt efforts 
by extremists to develop a narrative that 
leverages these challenges.42 
 The narrative of Boko Haram for instance is very apt and appealing 
to people of northern Nigeria origin (especially the Muslims) and perhaps 
people around the fringes of northern Nigeria in Chad, Cameroon and Niger. 
The Boko Haram narrative is simply ‘to establish an Islamic caliphate where 
people will be governed by Sharia’. This narrative was able to fly through 
the northern geopolitics because a lot of northern Nigeria Muslims have 
always been averse to Western value system. Additionally the internal 
dynamics prevalent in the northern Nigeria (extreme poverty, corruption and 
massive indigent youth population)43 made the narrative potent as it created 
succor for the army of hopeless youths who felt the narrative could bring 
redemption to their hopelessness.  
 To justify the claim that the Boko Haram narrative is something that 
can easily be received with open hands in the north, we have to reexamine 
the perception of some northerners concerning Western values. For instance, 
Ibrahim a prominent northern Nigeria Muslim discourages his friends and 
associates from enrolling their children for vaccination against polio because 
he suspects that Western countries who provided these vaccines have 
injected some sterilizing agents that could make children impotent. He 
believes strongly that it is part of the larger Western agenda for population 
control.44 So, when the Boko Haram narrative began to spread, most of the 
local Mullah especially those who never went through Western educational 
system discretely embraced it.   
 The ‘message’on the other hand is different from narrative. The 
message is usually derived from the narrative. Message is usually flexible 
and changes in accordance with the unfolding socio-political scenes. 
Message is the combination of actions, activities to interpret the narrative. 
Message can also be understood as the implementation or enforcement of the 
narrative. So the message “Western Education is forbidden”only resonated 
an already existing stereotype against the Western values which is the 
narrative. The message of the Boko Haram in Nigeria is that “Western 
Education is forbidden”. This message is interpreted through commentaries 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43GuilainDenoeux and Lynn Carter, “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism,”February 
2009, http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/sub-
saharan_africa/publications/docs/guide_to_drivers_of_ve.pdf. 
44Interview with Mallam Ibrahim Abutalib, Abuja, 2014. Ibrahim is a very learned Muslim 
in both Islamic and Western Education. He is a Computer Engineer and built a successful 
private firm. He is highly respected in his community. 
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and broadcasts against structures that seem to represent Western values 
(attacks on schools, bombings of police outpost and Force headquarters in 
Abuja, attacks on United Nations headquarters and media houses in Abuja) 
and the government of Nigeria which they believe represent the interest of 
the West.  
 The message is usually expressed in public domain using symbols of 
heroism and fear to alter public perceptions and opinion. Usually, the Boko 
Haram group used internet platforms in order to attract a great many viewers 
and supporters. The YouTube videos uploaded revealed the extent of the 
group creativity. The message could be appreciated further with the “African 
Magic”kind of background created for each video and the fierce appearance 
of the leader sounding warning to the FGN which signify and project such 
action as a symbol of heroism. The video could be likened to some action 
Indian movies which are usually appealing to northern Nigerian youths.45 So 
the Boko Haram sold its brand through effective messaging using social 
media and other Internet platforms. Having explained the meaning of 
narrative and messages within the context of this paper, it is then important 
to give an overview of the Boko Haram narrative and messages. 
 
Overview of Boko Haram Narrative and Message 
 The Boko Haram narrative is simply the ambition of establishing an 
Islamic caliphate where Muslims will be ruled in accordance with Allah’s 
law. The messages plugged into this narrative are fashioned along religious 
divide, terror and heroism. The group claims that “Western Education is 
forbidden”was demonstrated with the abduction of Chibok school girls. The 
abduction of the Chibok girls caused a lot of public debates within Nigerian 
political space and the international community. About two years since the 
abduction of the girls, there is serious apprehension, in various quarters that 
many of the girls may have died of natural causes or killed by their captors.46 
No doubt, the thought that over 200 girls could be kidnapped in a school in 
Nigeria is a very powerful message to the public concerning Boko Haram’s 
resentment for Western Education. The FGN ought to have quickly 
countered the message given the fact that the region is the most educationally 
backward in Nigeria. Countering the messages also became necessary even 
for the unintended consequences such message may have generated. 
 Unfortunately, the issue of the abducted Chibok girls turned into a 
sensitive Muslim-Christian dichotomy in Nigeria. It took about eighteen 
days before the former President GoodluckEbele Jonathan responded to the 
                                                          
45 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
46 Ibrahim Sawab, “500 days after: Chibok parents seek reunion with daugthers”, Daily 
Trust, 27 August 2015, p.15.  
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fact that some girls were abducted.47 Again, the action of the FGN by not 
responding promptly to the issue of abduction of the girls was a 
demonstration that the state failed in its fundamental objective of providing 
security to the people. Instead, religious sentiments were wiped over the 
Chibok girls’abduction. This again resonate Boko Haram original narrative 
and placed them on the spotlight as the main actor. The action and inaction 
of the FGN became a major feeder of the Boko Haram narrative and helped 
to propagate the message of Boko Haram brand.  
 The security operatives were also caught up in the confusion as they 
were engrossed in rivalry, issuing conflicting information and publicly 
discrediting each other. The strategic lapse on the part of the FGN to counter 
the narrative and messages helped the Boko Haram brand to permeate into 
the national polity. The peak of the religious divide which was the main 
message of Boko Haram became obvious within government circles as 
political elites began to trade accusations over who was responsible for the 
failure to stop Boko Haram's violence.48 When some Nigerian soldiers 
allegedly accused the FGN for laxity in handling the Boko haram narratives, 
they were charged for mutiny. This further strengthened the Boko Haram 
narrative as it became obvious to the public that Nigeria was actually not 
winning the war.49 The entire scene that evolved was a strategic blunder and 
an indictment on both the FGN and the AFN.   
 Boko Haram was able to spread the hate message to the entire 
northeast through indiscriminate bombing and attack on soft targets. The 
messages of hate and heroism have always been constant in its bid to spread 
its narrative. For instance, the Madalla church bombing was designed to 
pitch Christians and Muslims against each other in Nigeria. The bombing of 
the United Nations (UN) Building was meant to give its operations 
international outlook and claim a heroic credit. Similarly, hoisting of black 
flags in villages and communities were demonstration of its legitimacy and 
heroic attributes. One of such example of seizing communities was when the 
Boko Haram made the Emir of Mubi to relocate to Yola town.50 Any 
incident that can cause a traditional ruler to vacate his subjects and relocate 
to another city can be described as very instructive. These messages were 
sold to mostly youths who in their adventurous nature would love to key into 
                                                          
47 http://www.theparadigmng.com/2014/06/01/jonathan-believe-chibok-girls-abducted-18-
days-obasanjo-video/ 
48 Francis Abayomi, “Politics and Religion in Boko Haram narrative”, accessed from the 
internet, 8 january 2016, http://dailyindependentnig.com/2014/10/politics-religion-boko-
haram-narrative/ 
49 Clement Ejiofor, “Soldiers Mutiny in Borno: Nigeria Army to Start Investigation”, 
accessed online, NAIJ, www.naij.com/66346.html.  
50Kabir R Anwar, “Emir of Mubi, others move to Yola”, Daily Trust newspaper, Wednesday 
10 September 2014, p.4.  
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such fantasies. Aside from the heroic attributes in the act of challenging 
government authority, declaring territory and hoisting of flags within 
Nigeria’s sovereignty, there was also the angle of being capable of providing 
alternative solutions to life. This is a support the FGN and states in the 
northeast seem to have failed totally.  
 The indiscriminate terror (killing of both Christians and Muslims) 
was a message of “you are either with us or against us”irrespective of 
religious affinity. A lot of Muslims were killed and Mosques destroyed 
thereby sustaining the message of terror for a while. The message of terror 
helped them to gather and recruit more members who in the face of 
hopelessness ofmaking a living, had to join Boko Haram as a survival or 
self-preservationtactics. The effectiveness of the message of fear and terror 
can be better appreciated when a scenario is simulated as thus:   
Imagine Boko Haram raids your community 
and sack your local chief and the religious 
leaders. Held everyone under siege. For 
months the government forces was unable to 
repel them. As a result, the Boko Haram group 
enacted laws and enforced them accordingly to 
the later without any hindrance. What would 
you do as a young person within the age 
bracket of 17 and 25 seeing that some 
members of the Boko Haram torturing you and 
your family are about your age mates? 
Honestly, you will find a way to join without.51 
 The Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
YemiOsinbajo corroborated the scenario painted above when he said that 
many young people conscripted by Boko Haram to either kill or act as 
suicide bombers deserve the sympathy of the public because they were 
probably forced to become terrorists under circumstances beyond their 
control.52The challenge for the FGN therefore is how to create and promote a 
comprehensive, credible counter-narrative to Boko Haram violent 
extremism. The FGN had made some efforts to create its framework for 
counter-narrative and messages. Details of the initiatives are given 
subsequently.  
 
 
 
                                                          
51Response from an inmate when recounting his experience as member of the group and 
how he joined, Abuja, December 2015. 
52 http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/192243-most-young-boko-haram-
terrorists-are-also-victims-osinbajo.html 
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Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy and Framework 
 Since 2013 considerable efforts were made to develop a soft power 
framework for CT. The different activities/programs for an effective soft 
power CT strategy are discussed subsequently. 
a. Articulation of a National Counterterrorism Strategy. When 
the fight against Boko Haram began in early 2000, the AFN 
acknowledged that it was not trained for this kind of warfare hence 
the need to develop new capabilities.53 Consequently, efforts were 
put in place to develop a national CT strategy. Series of workshops, 
seminars and roundtable discussions were held at different defense 
and security policy levels consultations. A foreign consultant was 
engaged to put together the proceedings of series of workshops and 
seminars held in preparation for the compilation of strategies. These 
culminated in the launch of 3 documents titled: The National 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), National Security Strategy 
and Nigeria’s Countering Violent Extremism Program by the Office 
of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).54 These well-articulated 
documents received inputs from the academia, various Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and international organizations 
like the United States Embassy and the EU.  
b. Establishment of a National Coordination Centre. In one of 
the series of workshops held in preparation for the drafting of 
NACTEST, the participants also highlighted the urgent need for a CT 
information coordination centre. The recommendation of the 
workshop was for the FGN to establish a National Information 
Centre (NAIC). The NAIC was eventually established in 2013 under 
the leadership of the Director General of the National Orientation 
Agency (NOA). The concept of the NAIC was to establish a research 
based centre that will help the FGN to coordinate the entire 
information framework concerning the activities of Boko Haram. 
This was found to be very timely as it was anticipated that it would 
help address the challenge of dissemination of conflicting 
information by the different security agencies. Unfortunately when 
the FGN under the GEJ regime constituted the membership of the 
Centre, it was again another cluster of people who had no clue on 
what strategic communications was all about. Unconsciously the 
NAIC which was supposed to be a think tank for the FGN was 
reduced to a press briefing centre before it finally folded up 
immediately the Buhari regime surfaced.    
                                                          
53 Gen Azazi, National Security Adviser, 2011 
54 Nigeria’s Official CT documents 
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c. Presidential Initiative on Northeast (PINE). The Presidential 
Initiative for Northeast (PINE) is a youth empowerment scheme 
launched by former president GoodluckEbele Jonathan to help curtail 
the rate of unemployment, forestall nonviolence, peaceful co-
existence among youths in the Northeast. The youths being 
considered by PINE are those affected by the crisis caused by the 
Boko Haram sect. The initiative seeks to create economic 
rejuvenation and redevelopment of the Northeast states of Nigeria. It 
is expected to help to implement an emergency assistance and 
economic stabilization program in the north eastern states. PINE 
receives support from global development partners, international and 
local business organizations. Some programs of the PINE include 
provision of Special Mobile Classrooms (SMOCs) for IDP camps 
and provision of basic healthcare requirements. PINE works with 
local and international NGOs, officials of the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA), officials of Federal and state 
ministries, officials of the State Emergency Management Agency 
(SEMA) as well as officials of the United Nations. 
d. Victims’Support Fund. The Victims Support Fund was set up 
by the FGN to address the plight of victims of terrorism or 
insurgency who among them lost their lives and means of livelihood. 
The VSF is expected to source for funds from different sources in 
order to carry out its programs. The VSF has been in the forefront of 
providing medical care for victims, food and accommodation. In 
August 2015, the government released five billion naira, it pledged to 
the VSF. While the FGN is intensifying efforts to scale up support for 
the victims of these unfortunate incidents, the number of victims and 
the length of time that they require support continue to increase. It is 
for this reason that the VSF is diversifying its sources of funding 
support. 
 
Issues with Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy and Framework 
 It is observed that there are different overlapping initiatives on CT in 
Nigeria and most of them are government driven. This is why regime change 
affects the continuity of each initiative. The objective of the different 
initiatives are not clearly defined hence the recurring cases of overlapping 
objectives as with PINE and VSF. The sudden decision by the ONSA to 
produce another strategic communication framework is a clear demonstration 
of inconsistent government policies. Since the FGN under the auspices of the 
ONSA was able to adopt a NACTEST, it will be obviously wasteful to start 
another exercise of articulation of a NACTEST. What have actually changed 
wasthe political regime and not the strategy in combating the threat. The 
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provision of food items and other essential items to the IDPs Camps by PINE 
and VSF is well-acknowledged but it must go beyond that. To move beyond 
current effort of providing basic essentials is a temporary measure in CT.  
 There is need for a comprehensive and holistic operational 
framework for the soft power strategy in the northeast. The framework shall 
first understand the narrative and messages of the terrorist groups, while 
developing a counter narrative and messages. The framework needs to link 
up all the different initiatives together under a common goal and create 
linkages on how to complement each other. This is bearing in mind the fact 
that the causes of violent extremism in northeast Nigeria are complex and 
multidimensional, however local. Having examined some of the local issues 
that causes violent extremism, it became obvious that developing a 
framework that hinged on a religious narrative with developmental messages 
will help to fill the gap. It is this perception that led to the articulation of the 
UMMAH for CVE framework.55 It is a grand strategy meant to complement 
military action. The framework is designed to be driven by CSOs and local 
communities while the FGN alongside the AFN stand as the coordinator.  
 
Using Muslims Mannerism andHabits (UMMAH) 
 UMMAH for CVE started with a deliberate attempt to understand the 
narrative and messages of the group. It is the assumption of the researchers 
that Boko Haram narrative is a flavor that has always been tasty to northern 
Nigeria in the past, and still has potency for present and future appeal. It is 
the same narrative that was used during the Maitasine saga in the 1980s 
which led to bloody religious crisis. Then, the FGN was able to use military 
action to crush the Maitasine Sect who was then active in Kano and Kaduna. 
Twenty years after the Maitasine Sect saga, the country is confronted by the 
Boko Haram threats. The recurrence of this threat made the researchers to 
draw conclusion that there are pull/push factors in northern Nigeria that 
makes its people susceptible to violent extremism.   
 As noted earlier, UMMAH is an acronym for“Using Muslim 
Manners and Habits”for CVE. It is a strategy with the sole objective of 
countering the Boko Haram narrative and messaging with equally appealing 
Islamic teaching of peace and tolerance. The findings and review of the 
activities of Boko Haram was that they have been able to sustain the group 
over the years, due to narrative of injustice, poverty, piety and discrimination 
                                                          
55 John N.T. "Jack" Shanahan “Foreword”, in Laurie Fenstermacher (ed) “Topical strategic 
multi-layer assessment and Air Force Research Laboratory Multi-disciplinary white paper in 
support of counter-terrorism and counter-WMD 
Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies”, internet accessed, 11 
January 2016, http://nsiteam.com/scientist/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/U_Counter-Violent-
Extremism-Final_Approved-for-Public-Release_28Oct11v3.pdf  
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which was very easy to understand by the poor, illiterate and uninformed 
population. The narrative was flexible, adaptable, and has a strong emotional 
and religious appeal which resonated with the large and often idle youth 
population. Above all, the Boko Haram utilized the rivalry in the Nigerian 
political stage to advance its course and perfect its narratives. Most of its 
messages were thought-provoking, which generated debate among Nigerians 
by keeping the people busy while the group withdrew and re-strategize. 
Having observed these featuresin the activities of the group, the way forward 
is to develop a counter narrative and messaging strategy with powerful 
contents that could address some of the psychological and socio-cultural 
issues the Boko Haram continually exploited in getting people radicalized.  
 The word UMMAH is chosen as the framework for CVE in Nigeria 
and the Sahel region. The acronym UMMAH was chosen because it fits the 
Islamic word ‘Ummah’which means the ‘Islamic Brotherhood’and it 
functions as a nation for all Muslims56 as proclaimed by scholars like Al 
Afghani and SayyibQutb.57 UMMAH for CVE is however an entirely 
different concept from Ummah as brotherhood. The choice of UMMAH is to 
build a narrative that resonate the concept of brotherhood, oneness or 
community of faithful as a concept that is very key and central in Islam 
irrespective of sect. The UMMAH narrative therefore is the love for the 
brotherhood in which the messages are tailored to emphasize the features of 
the Ummah, roles, morals, expectations and ultimately unification with the 
creator. Therefore the choice for the term UMMAH was carefully selected to 
appeal to the emotional sentiments of Muslims, create a window for 
radicalized youths to reexamine, rethink and make rational decision about 
religious accommodation. It has no coercive instrument instead it is purely 
an appeal to conscience, faith and reason, through exploiting the messages of 
love, peace, neighborliness and goodwill the prophet SAW preached and 
enjoyed from Muslim and non-Muslim in his days.   
 
Concept and motivation for UMMAH 
 Muslims generally pride themselves as having some of the best 
cultures (manners, habits, etiquette etc). The Islamic mannerism and habits 
can be subsumed in Islamic etiquette. These etiquettes are clearly stated in 
the Qur’an and most of the authentic Hadiths. Etiquette holds a very high 
esteem in Islam. In the Qur’an, Surah Taha, Allah instructed Prophet Musa 
to adopt the correct etiquette when he arrived at the blessed valley of Tuwa. 
Allah said: “Oh Musa remove your shoes, for you are in the blessed valley of 
                                                          
56 Robert A Saunders, “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons 
Affair’, Nations and Nationalism”, 14 (2), 2008. Internet accessed, 9 January 2016, 
http://www.nabilechchaibi.com/resources/Ummah%20as%20nation.pdf 
57 Ibid, p.306 
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Tuwa”(Qur’an Surah Taha: 12). There are also several morals, values and 
everyday etiquette taught by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). These covers 
different aspects of life (neighborliness, coexistence, peaceful resolution of 
dispute) and when examined they are in conformity with the ideals of 
modern day society. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) summed up his 
message by stating “I have been sent to perfect the best of manners”.58 
Muslims are therefore obliged to be aware of how to deal with each other in 
a way that promotes their positive image. It was narrated that Luqman once 
said to his son, “Oh my son: let your speech be good and your face be 
smiling; you will be more loved by the people than those who give them 
provisions.59 For instance, there are Islamic teachings that emphasizes on 
how to relate and live in peace with other people.  
 The UMMAH strategy therefore leverages on the framework that 
every Muslim is a brother to the other. Saunders noted that Muslims see their 
religion as a source of identity which is stronger than nationalism.60 It is this 
strong identity built around Ummah that made the acronym UMMAH a 
suitable counter narrative against Boko Haram narrative or any other terrorist 
group within the Sahel region that uses the banner of Islamic caliphate to 
inflict terror. Terrorism is about perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy 
and will. Terrorism is not won by killing terrorists or won by seizing 
territory, it is won by altering the psychological factors that are most 
relevant, that makes them hardened towards holding such beliefs. These are 
the features that the UMMAH narrative will provide to the Ummah. Under 
UMMAH, different messages will be developed to counter whatever 
messages Boko Haram presents to the public. 
 The UMMAH for CVE is a composite counter narrative 
encompassing series of messages to counter Boko Haram messages in 
Nigeria. The main objective of the UMMAH strategy for CVE is to deny 
Boko Haram or any other would be terrorist group in Nigeria, the ability to 
impose its will on the youth through spreading of false doctrines and 
consolidating them through illegitimate violence on the society. The 
UMMAH for CVE will highlight through series of messages that the Boko 
Haram brand is not part of the brotherhood since they have chosen to go 
against humanity. The UMMAH for CVE will also create the environment 
for the brotherhood to devise a means of communicating with those who 
have gone astray (Boko Haram members) and give them the opportunity to 
retract their steps. The UMMAH for CVE ultimately mobilizes the will of 
the people, and build their capacity using Islamic tenets, principles and 
                                                          
58www.iqrasense.com/muslim-character/the-islamic-etiquette-of-dealing-wth-people.html, 
accessed 14 January 2016. 
59Ibid. 
60 Robert A Saunders, Op.Ct. 
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culture (MESSAGES) to manage their differences peacefully. UMMAH for 
CVE means the whole community of Muslims bound together to combat 
Violent Extremism.  
 The target population of the UMMAH for CVE is actually the entire 
community encompassing the traditional rulers, market women, school 
principals, school headmasters, teachers, local medical dispensaries, mullahs 
who control madrasas etc. The brotherhood community will be coordinated 
by officials of government. The medium of communication in this 
brotherhood is through ‘One-on-One’engagement, television and radio 
messages in local languages. Mobile cinemas could be activated in village 
square where UMMAH programs will be publicly aired.  The programs to be 
aired are going to be programs designed to emphasize the essence of Ummah 
(the brotherhood). This will create the required community resilience and 
help to pitch the people against the Boko Haram brand.  
 
Implementation of the UMMAH for CVE  
 The UMMAH for CVE is described in Figure 1. The figurepresents 
the different actors of UMMAH for CVE, the levels of operations and their 
relationship with one another. It is a comprehensive framework for a typical 
local community in Nigeria where the people have five (5) major Contact 
Points. For example, Educational Institution (Schools), Occupational 
Institutions (Farm/Market Groups), Traditional Institution (Palace), Health 
Institution (Dispensary/Medical Centers, Religious Institution 
(Churches/Mosques). Each Contact Point articulates its own counter 
messages. From the diagram, it can be seen that the local community drives 
the program through the assistance of CSOs that interprets the different 
messages into actionable programs. The medium of communication is going 
to be divided into 2 main channels; through cinemas (presenting different 
dramas and announcements), radio programs and one-on-one programs in 
churches and mosques.  
 At each Contact Point there is a Message Officer selected from the 
local community and trained by the Message Centre to deliver all UMMAH 
for CVE Messages, interpret them and give feedback to the Message Centre. 
From the foregoing, it implies that a Message Centre needed to be 
established to coordinate all the activities and programs for a maximum of 5 
communities. The Message Centre will be staffed by strategic 
communication experts drawn from different CSOs. Their task is to 
continuously design the series of counter messages that bears on the 
brotherhood. CSOs that are focused on issues like conflict prevention, CVE, 
de-radicalization, education, inter-religious dialogue, as well as social and 
economic development will be most relevant because of their experiences. 
The Message Centre will train the Message Officers who must be individuals 
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living within the communities and they are paid for the services. The 
Message Officers serve as interface between the Message Centre and the 
communities. They are the in-built feedback mechanism for the UMMAH 
for CVE in Nigeria. The essence is to ensure that at every level the people 
are able to make personal connection to the programs and strengthen their 
respective commitment to achieving the government objectives. A Guide 
Handbook for both the Message Centre and the Message Officers could be 
issued to all parties so that they will at all-timeunderstand the direction of 
UMMAH for CVE.  
 The Messaging Centre must be able to produce messages that reflects 
or illuminates the essence of UMMAH for CVE. It could take the following 
formats:  
a. Projecting UMMAH in terms of government activities and programs 
to reestablish the society. 
b. Denouncing the activities of Boko Haram from the light of Ummah 
(Islamic Brotherhood). 
c. Rendering local services to the affected communities in the light of 
Ummah (Islamic Brotherhood). 
 The messages need to be communicated to build common purpose 
across the operational ground and at the end affected communities. This will 
guide everyone’s behavior involved in the UMMAH programs. There is also 
the need to make the message documents freely available for everyone 
involved in the fight against terrorism including military personnel.  
FIGURE 1: Schematic explanation of the operations of the UMMAH for CVE in Nigeria 
 
Source: Researchers data collected from different sources were articulated to make the 
model, 2016 
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 The Message Centre need to publish a summary of the message on a 
range of materials for the whole society. For instance, buses, keke, sign 
posts, among others should bears contents that emphasizes Ummah and the 
need to support UMMAH for CVE. To get everyone fit into the framework 
of UMMAH, there is the need to organize a series of workshops for 
stakeholders to help build strategic communication capability that would 
help contribute to the series of messages.  
 
Conclusion 
 If there is an absence of a comprehensive strategy to CVE, it is 
difficult to squash the narrative that sustains motivation for terrorism. There 
is a consensus that CVE is the holistic framework for CT across the globe. 
Most governments across the international community are increasingly 
adopting it as the way forward to CT. Nigeria, being part of the global 
community and a victim of terrorism by Boko Haram also seeks for an 
effective CVE program. In the bid to CT, it is agreed that the FGN alongside 
other key stakeholders has a critical role to play in enhancing community 
resilience to violent extremism in northeast Nigeria through coherent and 
consistent engagement with the local communities. One of the key pillars of 
this engagement relies on the development of effective counter-narrative and 
messaging system. Considering the extent of destruction caused by religious 
extremism and the recurring tendency of such group in northern Nigeria, one 
can conclude that there is urgent need to address the threats of Boko Haram 
in Nigeria.  
 This can be achieved through understanding the flow of the Boko 
Haram narrative and messages and providing alternatives to them. The FGN 
relied on military action to counter Boko Haram yet, this strategy alone 
cannot be entirely effective when factors that provide incentive to their 
narratives still exist. The option of CVE suggests countering the narrative 
and messages of extremism that could implode or explode into violence. The 
investigation into the underlying meaning of the Boko Haram narrative and 
messages, and its essence led to the formulation of the UMMAH for CVE 
framework. The UMMAH for CVE is a composite counter narrative 
encompassing series of messages from the Qu’ran and Hadith that can 
counter Boko Haram messages in Nigeria. The UMMAH for CVE required 
that a Messaging Centre is set up to coordinate all its activities and 
programs. It also required the inputs of the locals who are to drive the 
messages to the targeted population.  
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